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ACT 13 AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
*

Lucas Liben and MarlaD. Tortorice

Act 13 was enacted on February14, 2012, markingthe first
major overhaul of Pennsylvania's oil and gas legislation in over
thirty years. The Act, which sought to provide uniformity across
the state for oil and gas development, was immediately met with
challenges in the courts. After years of litigation, many of its key
provisions were declared unconstitutional through the line of
Robinson Township cases. Of these challenges, the one with the
potential to have the most far-reachingconsequences came under
the EnvironmentalRights Amendment (ERA). While this claim
was initially dismissedin the Commonwealth Court, the plurality
opinion in the PennsylvaniaSupreme Court basedits holding that
certainprovisions ofAct 13 were unconstitutionalon the ERA.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Robinson H1
was quickly deemed a landmark decision because, until this time,
the ERA had largely been ignored. The opinion's interpretationof
the ERA could suggest a shift in the way future courts assess
claims under the ERA and in environmentaljurisprudenceoverall.
This Article analyzes the case law succeeding Robinson II to
determine i, five years later, the decision's critical textual
interpretation of the ERA has had the momentous impact on
Pennsylvania's environmental regulatory scheme that some
predicted.
INTRODUCTION

The Environment Rights Amendment (ERA) has failed to
gain much attention from both the legislature and the courts since
its enactment in the Pennsylvania Constitution.I When Act 13, the
new statutory framework for regulation of oil and gas operations

* The authors wish to thank Jennifer A. Smokelin for her advice and mentorship
in completing this article.
I See infra Part I.A.
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in Pennsylvania, was initially challenged, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court quickly dismissed the petitioners' claim that
state preemption of oil and gas regulations violated the ERA. 2
The claim was raised again on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. 3 The plurality opinion dedicated sixty-five pages
of its analysis to resolve the proper interpretation and application
of the Amendment in light of the Act. 4 The Court held that,
"several core provisions of Act 13 violate[d] the Commonwealth's
duties as trustee of Pennsylvania's public natural resources under
the Environmental Rights Amendment ... ."5 Such attention to the
contours of the ERA was unprecedented.6
This Article addresses the question of whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Robinson H
was the beginning of a shift in environmental jurisprudence that
many scholars predicted it would be.7 This Article concludes that
there has not been a massive upheaval of environmental law post
Robinson H Moreover, this Article shows that, due to the decision
in Robinson II being a plurality, there was a trend in the lower
courts to apply the same test that had been in effect under the ERA
prior to Robinson I This is not to say, however, that Robinson Hs
impact is not developing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued
a majority opinion in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation v. Commonwealth on June 17, 2017. Still, the
anticipated impact of Robinson Hhas yet to occur.

2 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 489 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012)
thereinafter Robinson 11 (Commonwealth Court reasoning that "[Act 13] preempts a
municipalities' obligation to plan for environmental concerns for oil and gas operations ...
because [municipalities] were relieved of their responsibilities to strike a balance between
oil and gas development and environmental concerns under the MPC [the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code], Petitioners have not made out a cause of action under
Article 1, § 27.").
3 Robinson Twp., Washington Cty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915-16 (Pa.
2013) [hereinafter Robinson II].
Id. at 933-1016.
5
1d. at 913.
6 See Id. at 901.
7 See, e.g., Richard Rinaldi, Dormant for Decades, the Environmental Rights
Amendment of Pennsylvania's Constitutional Recently Received a Spark of Life from
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 24 WIDENER L.J. 435, 458 (2015) ("[In light of the
Amendment's swift passage, prominent placement, and clear purpose, it certainly does seem
a plurality of Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices got it right-finally."); John C.
Dernbach, The PotentialMeanings ofa ConstitutionalPublic Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 518
(2015) ("Whatever comes next, it is not likely to be a return to the time before Robinson
Township.").
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Part I explains how the ERA was interpreted before
Robinson II Part II discusses the plurality opinion in Robinson I
and how it marked a departure from previous interpretations.
Lastly, Part III surveys case law addressing challenges involving
the ERA post-Robinson II
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
P RE- ROBINSON H
A. The Enactment and Subsequent Disappearance of the
EnvironmentalRights Amendment
In response to the environmental impact of the coal
industry, the ERA was introduced.8 Upon passing unanimously in
both the House and Senate, and accumulating widespread voter
approval by a margin of four-to-one, the ERA was ratified in
1971-incorporated as Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.9 The Amendment reads:
Natural Resources and the Public Estate-The
people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of
all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.' 0
There are various clauses found within the ERA. The first
sentence grants individual environmental rights: "The people have
a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.""

8 See Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania
Constitution:Twenty Years Later andLargelyUntested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123 (1991)
("The public approved the amendment by a vote of 1,021,342 to 259,979 ....
9 John C. Dernbach & Edmond J. Sonnenberg, A LegislativeHistory ofArticle I
Section 27ofthe Constitution ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, 24 WIDENERL.J., 181,
280 (2015).
10 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971).
11PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971); see also Robinson I1 83 A.3d at 953 (discussing
the substantive standards contained in the language of the constitutional provision).
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The second and third sentences create a separate, public trust
clause: "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people." 12
For most of its existence, the ERA has been governed by two
key Pennsylvania cases: Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower and Payne v. Kassab. 13 These decisions largely
restricted the effectiveness of the ERA. As one commentator noted:
"[Tihe Amendment seems to have more symbolic than substantive
value, inscribed on plaques and quoted in speeches, but rarely used
in decision making." 14
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower
was the first major case decided under the ERA. The
Commonwealth sought to enjoin construction of a 307-foot
observation tower on private land that was adjacent to the
Gettysburg National Military Park.1 5 Based on the ERA's first
clause, the Commonwealth alleged that the tower would interfere
with the "natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values" of the
environment because the "modern architecture would degrade the
site's aesthetics and deprive visitors of the historic experience of
the battlefield."1 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's holding that the Commonwealth failed to carry its
burden of proof on the issue of whether the tower would injure the
Gettysburg environment.1 7
More importantly, however, was the discussion regarding
whether the ERA was self-executing or required implementing
legislation. The Commonwealth took the position that the
Amendment was self-executing, stating "that the people have been
given a right to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment, and that no further legislation

2

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971); see also RobinsonIT 83 A.3d at 977-78 (discussing
the substantive standards contained in the language of the constitutional provision).
13 See Commonwealth v. Nat'1 Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588
(Pa. 1973) [hereinafter Gettysburg]; See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976)
1

[hereinafter Payne].
'4 John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It

Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article 1, Section 27,
103 DICK. L. REV. 693, 696 (1999).
'6 Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 589-90.
16 Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 441 (citing Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 590).
17 Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 595.
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is necessary to vest these rights in the people."' 8 Justice O'Brien,
writing for the plurality, 19 disagreed:
A Constitution is primarily a declaration of
principles of the fundamental law. Its provisions are
usually only commands to the legislature to enact
laws to carry out the purposes of the framers of the
Constitution, or mere restrictions upon the power of
the legislature to pass laws, yet it is entirely within
the power of those who establish and adopt the
Constitution to make any of its provisions selfexecuting 20 .... The reason is that, while the purpose
may be to establish rights or to impose duties, they
do not in and of themselves constitute a sufficient
rule by means of which such right may be protected
or such duty enforced. 21
Thus, the plurality opinion in Gettysburgconcluded that:
[Tlhe provisions of § 27 of Article 1 of the
Constitution merely state the general principle of
law that the Commonwealth is trustee of
Pennsylvania's public natural resources with power
to protect the 'natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic
values' of its environment. If the Amendment was
self-executing, action taken under it would pose
serious problems of constitutionality, under both the
equal protection clause and the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 22
In United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the

Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 588-89(Justice O'Brien delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Justice
Pomeroy. Justice Hix concurred in the result. Justice Roberts delivered a concurring
opinion, joined by Justice Manderino. Chief Justice Jones delivered a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justice Eagan).
20 Id. at 591 (quoting 6 R.C.L. § 52, p. 57 (1915)).
18

19

21 Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 165 (8th ed. 1927)).
22

Id. at 594-95.
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Gettysburg plurality opinion as holding that the ERA was not
self-executing, 23 despite the fact that, as the Robinson H Court
later pointed out, "only two of the seven Justices in Gettysburg
subscribed to that view; two Justices concluded the opposite; and
three Justice did not address the issue." 24
Payne v. Kassab, decided three years after Gettysburg,
further limited the Amendment's efficacy. 25 In Payne, local
residents sought to enjoin the City of Wilkes-Barre from widening
a city street and eliminating a half-acre of the River Common-a
public park adjoining the Susquehanna River. 26 The ERA was
being used by residents to check the Commonwealth's police power
(as was evident in the individual rights clause) instead of an
enforcement tool the Commonwealth used against residents, as
was the case in Gettysburg.27 The residents argued that the
Commonwealth, through the approval of the River Street project,
violated its duties as trustee under Article I, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 28
Payne also differs from Gettysburgin that it provides both
a majority opinion and a framework under which to analyze claims
that rely on the ERA. 29 Concluding that Article I, § 27 required a
"realistic and not merely legalistic" test, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court provided a three-part balancing test for
whether the Amendment had been observed.30 This test was
neither expressly adopted nor applied in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision; rather, it was mentioned in a footnote:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable
statutes and regulations relevant to the protection
of the Commonwealth's public natural resources? (2)
Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to
reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?

23

United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 635 A.2d 612, 620 (Pa.

1993).

24 Robinson II , 83 A.3d at 964 ; see also Susan Kessler, Interpretingthe PostRobinson Township Environmental Protection Amendment, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 585
(2016).
25
Payne, 361 A.2d at266
Id. at 264-65.
See id.
28 Id. at 272.
26
27

29
30

Kessler, supra note 26, at 586.
Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
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(3) Does the environmental harm which will result
from the challenged decision or action so clearly
outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that
to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion? 3
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
street expansion did not violate the ERA.3 2 The three-part
balancing test subsequently became the all-purpose test for
applying the ERA-both for claims which were based on the
Commonwealth's failure to do its duty as trustee as well as claims
based on the people's rights to the "natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values" of the environment. 33
Commentators have opined that the Payne balancing test
"virtually wrote [the ERA] out of existence" by "ensur[ing] that
laws tested against it would be sustained." 34 According to these
commentators, Payne's non-textual test focused not on conserving
and maintaining natural resources, but on managing their
degradation.3 5 More specifically, the third prong-the harmsbenefit analysis-required a showing that the harm to the
protected resources clearly outweighs the benefits of the
challenged action.36 This departure from the text, as Robinson H
later points out, allegedly failed to effectuate the purpose of the
Amendment which was to create an enforceable constitutional
right of environmental protection in the people. 37 Thus, Robinson
Hcan be viewed as a direct response to these stated failures of the
Payne test and an attempt to restore that right. 38
B. The Enactment ofAct 13 and its FirstChalenge
In 2012, the Pennsylvania General Assembly endeavored to
provide uniformity across the state for oil and gas development by

3 Id. (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), afd, 361
A.2d 263 (1976)).
32 Id. at 273.
33 Kessler, supra note 26, at 587.
34 Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania. A Model for
Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 151, 154 (2015).
35 Dernbach, supra note 16, at 713.
36 Robinson II 83 A.2d at 967; see also infra Part II.C.
a7 Id.
38 Id,
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passing Act 13 and amending the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act. 3 9
Act 13 required statewide uniformity in zoning ordinances relating
to oil and gas development. 0 It also prohibited any local regulation
of oil and gas operations, including environmental legislation. 4 1 In
effect, municipalities could no longer use their zoning powers to
regulate oil and gas development within their townships. 42
Act 13 was immediately challenged. 4 3 In Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson 1), several Pennsylvania
municipalities,
two
local elected
officials,
a non-profit
environmental group, and a physician (collectively, the "Citizens"),
challenged various provisions of the Act." The Commonwealth
Court held that § 3304 "violated substantive due process" because
it allowed incompatible uses in zoning districts and did not protect
the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, altered
the character of the neighborhood, and made irrational
classifications." 45 The Commonwealth Court quickly rejected the
remaining challenges to other aspects of Act 13, including the
claim that Act 13 violated the ERA. 6 Both the Citizens and the
Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 47

3 Act No. 13 of Feb. 14, 2012, 2012 Pa. Laws 87 (codified as amended at 58 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-3504 (2012)).
- Id. §§ 3301-3309.
41 Id. § 3303.
42 See id.
43Robinson 1 52 A.3d. at 468.
4Id.
4 Id. at 485, 490-93 (The Commonwealth Court also holding that § 3215(b)(4), the
provision of Act 13 that empowered the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP")
to grant variances from stream and wetland buffer zone requirements, violated the nondelegation doctrine embodied in Article 2, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Specifically, in the statute the DEP was delegated the authority to make legislative policy
judgments reserved to the General Assembly, but because the DEP was given "no guidance"
to inform its discretion and decision-making, this delegation was unconstitutional).
46 Id. at 488-89.
4 Id. at n. 3.
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II. REVITALIZATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: ACT 13 AND ROBINSONH

A. The Robinson II Decision
In Robinson H, a four-Justice majority struck down §§
3303,48 3304,49 and 3215(b)(4) as unconstitutional,5 0 affirming in
51
part and reversing in part the Commonwealth Court's decision.
The majority did not agree on a single rationale concerning the
grounds for the decision, meaning the holding regarding the ERA
was only a plurality. 52 Nevertheless, the novel interpretation of the
ERA in Robinson Hwarrants attention.
At the outset, the plurality opinion made clear that its
53
primary concern was the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Referring to previous decisions interpreting the ERA, Justice
Castille reasoned that "in circumstances where prior decisional
law has obscured the manifest intent of a constitutional provision
as expressed in its plain language, engagement and adjustment of
precedent as a prudential matter is fairly implicated and
salutary." 54
In beginning its interpretation of the ERA, the Court
discussed that it created two sets of rights. 5 5 First, the initial
clause created an individual environmental right: "The people
have a right to clear air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
56
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment."
The Court expressly placed the people's right to clean air and pure
water "on par with, and enforceable to the same extent as, any

48 Robinson I183 A.3d at 941 (Section 3303 requiring municipalities to uniformly
amend their existing zoning ordinances).
49 Id.(Section 3304 declared that statewide rules on oil and gas would preempt all

local zoning rules).
50 Id.(Section 3215(b)(4) empowered the DEP to grant variances from stream and
wetland buffer zone requirements).

51 Id. at 1000-01.
52 Id. at 913 (Justice Todd and Justice McCaffery joining Chief Justice Castille,
concluding the law violated the ERA); Id. at 1000-14 (Justice Bear concurring, but
preferring to resolve the case on substantive due process grounds); Id. at 1014-16 (Justices
Saylor and Eakin dissenting); Id. at 1000 (Former Justice Orie Melvin taking no part in the
decision).
53 Id. at 913.
54 Id. at 946.

55 Id.

at 913.

5( PA. CONST. art. I,

§ 27 (1971).
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other right reserved to the people in Article I."57 The issue of Act
13's application to the first clause was not properly developed in
arguments before the court.58
The ERA also created a second set of rights found in the
second and third sentences of the Amendment, known as the public
trust clause.5 9 This clause reads: "Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit
of all the people." 60 This is the clause upon which Robinson Hwas
decided.6 1
The Court further broke down the public trust clause and
wrote that the Commonwealth's trustee duty consists of two subduties. 62 The first is a duty "[tlo refrain from performing its trustee
duties respecting the environment unreasonably, including via
legislative enactments or executive action." 63 This means that the
Commonwealth has "a duty to refrain from encouraging or
permitting the ...

diminution ... of public natural resources."64

The second is a duty to "act affirmatively to protect the
environment, via legislative action."6 5 The court cited two
examples, the Clean Streams Act and the Air Pollution Control
Act, and explained that those "administrative details [were]
appropriately addressed by legislation because ... the generalized
terms comprising the ERA [did] not articulate them."6 6

Importantly, the court noted that "the call for complimentary
legislation ... [did] not override the otherwise plain conferral of
rights upon the people."6 7

In applying the ERA to Act 13, the Court found violations
of both of the General Assembly's duties as trustee under the
Amendment.6 8 First, § 3303 was held to violate the ERA's public

57 Id. at 953-54.
58 Id. at 974 n.56.
5 Id. at 913.
6 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971).
61 Id.
62 Robinson I 83 A.3d at 957.
63 I-d.
6 Id. at 957.
65 Id. at 958.
66 Id.
67 Ird.
68 Id. at 981
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trust doctrine because preempting zoning measures that
necessarily address local environmental concerns "commandled]
municipalities to ignore their obligations under [the ERA] and
further directled] municipalities to take affirmative actions to
69
undo existing protections of the environment in the localities."
This was held to be an improper exercise of police power that
violated the public trust doctrine.7 0
Similarly, the Court held that § 3304 violated the ERA
because it demanded municipalities to allow oil and gas operations
as a matter of right in every zoning district.7 1 Section 3304's
sweeping mandate would have a disparate effect on some localities
that would bear much greater "environmental and habitability
burdens than others," which violates the express constitutional
command that the environment be maintained "for the benefit of
all the people." 7 2 Act 13 would, by necessity, harm some areas more

than others, a disparity found to be incompatible with the trustee's
73
duty to protect the rights of all the beneficiaries of the trust.

Finally, the Court held that § 3215(b)(4) violated the public.
trust doctrine because it lacked any identifiable or enforceable
environmental standards by which the DEP could effectively.
"conserve and maintain" the corpus of the trust, specifically the
waters of the Commonwealth. 74
B. Robinson I's Response to Gettysburgand Self-execution
Robinson Halso addressed self-execution, concluding that,
unlike Gettysburg, the ERA was self-executing.7 5 In a footnote, the
Robinson I plurality first criticized United Artists' Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia for stating that Gettysburg
held "that § 27 was not self-executing and that legislative action

69 Id. at 978. Section 3303 stated that "environmental acts are of statewide
concern, and to the extent that they regulate oil and gas operations, occupy the entire field
of regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances." 58 Pa.C.S. § 3303.

7o Id.

71

Id. at 980-81.
72 Id. at 980.
7

3 Id.

74 Id.

at 983-84. Section 3215(b)(4) created a provision by which the department
could waive the distance restrictions of well sites "upon submission of a plan identifying
additional measures, facilities or practices to be employed ... to protect the waters of this
commonwealth." 58 Pa.C.S. § 3215(b)(4).
75 Id. at 964 n.52.
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was necessary to accomplish [its] goals."76 Because no majority of
the court agreed on the issue in Gettysburg, this was found to be
an incorrect statement of law.7 7 The plurality wrote that the
Commonwealth Court's decision in Gettysburg, the last majority
opinion holding that the Amendment was self-executing, must be
the prevailing view.78
C. Robinson Is

Response to Payne

The Robinson H Court also addressed Payne. The Court
first noted that "the Payne test appear[ed] to have become, for the
Commonwealth Court, the benchmark for § 27 decisions in lieu of
the constitutional text."7 9 Lower courts were foregoing the plain
language of the amendment in favor of the General Assembly's acts
and policy choices. 8 0 While the Payne test had its advantages (e.g.,
providing guidance on substantive standards in this area of law),
the test was found to be problematic for three main reasons.8 1
First, the test "describes the Commonwealth's obligationsboth as trustee and under the first clause of § 27-in much
narrower terms than the constitutional provision." 82 Second, "the
test assumes that the availability of judicial relief premised upon
§ 27 is contingent upon and constrained by legislative action."8 3
The test assumes that the ERA is not self-executing. 84 Third,
"Payne ... and its progeny have the effect of minimizing the
constitutional duties of executive agencies and the judicial branch,
and circumscribing the abilities of these entities to carry out their
constitutional duties independent of legislative control."8 5 For all
of these reasons, the plurality rejected the Payne test for all claims
except those based on a failure to comply with statutory standards
enacted to advance environmental interests. 86

76 Id. at 964 n.52 (quoting United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila.,
635 A.2d 612, 620 (Pa. 1993)).
n Id.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 966 (emphasis added).
80 See id.
81 Id. at 966-67.
82 Id. at 967.

&'Id.

See id.
8 Id.
86 Id.
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To replace the Payne test, the plurality held that the
General Assembly must "exercise its police powers to foster
sustainable development in a manner that respects the reserved
rights of the people to a clean, healthy, and esthetically-pleasing
environment."8 7 The court recognized that "the constitution
constrains this court not to be swayed by counter policy arguments
where the constitutional command is clear ...

in our view, the

framers and ratifiers of the Environmental Rights Amendment
intended the constitutional provision as a bulwark against
enactments, like Act 13, which permit development with such an
immediate, disruptive effect upon how Pennsylvanians live their
lives."8 8

D. The Predictions
Commentators were quick to call the plurality opinion in
Robinson Ha landmark decision.8 9 "While not amassing a majority
of the court, the plurality opinion will likely have major.
implications on lower courts and decision makers. For the first
time since its enactment, Article I, § 27 was employed to strike
down a statute as unconstitutional."9 0 The court's interpretation of,
the ERA "suggests a potentially vast sea-change in the way future
courts assess claims under the Environmental Rights Amendment,
namely that the plurality's textual interpretation of the
Amendment may revitalize its promise as a true constitutional
right to environmental protection." 9 1 Some further anticipated that
Robinson Ifs "unprecedented judicial affirmation of the people's
constitutional right to clean air and pure water can have farreaching effects on the gas drilling industry and others that may
cause 'actual or likely degradation' of Pennsylvania's natural
environment." 92
It must be noted that the plurality opinion, as such, on § 27
was not binding on other Pennsylvania courts.

87 Id. at 981.
88Id.
89

Dernbach, supranote 7, at 465.

90 Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 454-55.

91 Id. at 438.
92 Id. at 437.
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III. POST-ROBINSONII- SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE

ERA
For most of the five years after Robinson H lower courts
continued to apply the Payne test. What had been lacking in
Robinson HI-

a majority opinion -

did not come until June of

2017 in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth.
A. Payne Survives - At Least Until 2017
Despite Robinson I's

detailed critique of the three-part

balancing test established in Payne, lower courts continued to
employ the analysis until June of 2017.93
Decided on July 22, 2015 by the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, Feudale v. Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc. is the first in a
line of cases discussing the ERA. 94 Richard Feudale, a citizen of
Pennsylvania, filed a pro se complaint against Aqua Pennsylvania
and the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
(DCNR) challenging both the location of a waterline and
prospective logging and earthmoving activities on state forest
lands.9 5 "The essence of Feudale's claims against DCNR [was] that
DCNR [was] not doing enough to conserve and protect
Pennsylvania's natural resources ... ."96 The court concluded that
Feudale failed to state a claim under the ERA. 97
The Feudalecourt cited Robinson I but then employed the
Payne three-part test to determine if the proposed action violated
the ERA.98 Importantly, the Feudale court wrote in a footnote:
"This Court also note[s] that although the plurality in Robinson
Townslup took issue with this test, Payne I remains binding
precedent on this Court until overruled by either a majority
opinion of the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of this Court."9 9

9 It will remain to be seen if the majority Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding
in PEDFJ 161 A.3d 91 Ichanges that. A detailed discussion of PEDFfollows in Part III.C.
91 Feudale v. Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc., 122 A.3d 462 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
9 Id. at 464.
9 Id. at 467.

97

Id.

9 Id. at 468.
9 Id. at 468 n.8 (citing Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140,
159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) [hereinafter PEDF Ill). Note, the citation is to the
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Interestingly, despite citing the Payne test, the court did not apply
it prong-by-prong. Rather, the court, citing Robinson I first stated
that the ERA only requires the DCNR to first take into
consideration the environmental impact of proposed nonrecreational activities on the land.100 Then, the court applied the
third prong of Payne by stating that "Feudale has not alleged any
facts suggesting that the environmental harm which will result
from the [timbering] so clearly outweighs the benefits to be derived
therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion." 0 1 The court ultimately placed all emphasis on the
third prong of the Payne test, concluding that Feudale's claim
failed because "merely alleging that DCNR's proposed action will
do harm to the [land] is insufficient to establish a claim under the
Environmental Rights Amendment."1 02
Brockway Borough Municipal Authority v. Department of
Environmental Protection and United Refining Company v.
Department of EnvironmentalProtectionwere both appeals from
orders issued by the Environmental Hearing Board upholding,
issuances of well permits.10s Brockway was decided on January 6,
0 4 The
2016 by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.
Environmental Hearing Board had dismissed Brockway Borough's
challenge to an issuance of a second gas drilling permit.105
Brockway Borough argued that the Board erred in allowing the
Department of Environmental Protection to issue the permit
because the drilling would injure natural resources within their
municipality in violation of Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.10 6 In evaluating this claim, the Commonwealth.,
Court stated that it must weigh the following considerations
outlined in Payne:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable
statutes and regulations relevant to the protection

Commonwealth Court decision in PEDFand it is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
in PEDFthatultimately rejects Payne. See Part II.C.
100 Id. at 468.
10 Id (internal quotation removed).
102 Id. (citing PEDFIJ 108 A.3d at 158-59).
103 131 A.3d 578, 580 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016); 163 A.3d 1125, 1129 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2017).
04 Brockway, 131 A.3d at 578.
05 Id. at 585.
10 Id. at 582-83.
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of the Commonwealth's public natural resources? (2)
Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to
reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result
from the challenged decision or action so clearly
outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that
to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?10 7

Brockway Borough claimed that the permit violated the Oil and
Gas Act and Clean Streams Law because it would "result in
diminution of the water supply and discharges of industrial waste
into the waters of the Commonwealth." 0 8 The court found that no
violation of the Oil and Gas Act or the Clean Streams Law
occurred; therefore, petitioners failed to meet their burden under
the first prong of Payne.0 9 The second prong of Payne also was not
met because the Department included "nine special conditions in
the ...

permit to mitigate any potential harm ...

."110 Lastly,

Brockway Borough failed to claim that any environmental harm
which stemmed from the well would "so clearly outweigh the
benefits to be derived from the drilling that issuance of the ...
permit constitutes an abuse of discretion.""' The court in
Brockway made no mention of the Robinson II decision in its
analysis.
On June 12, 2017, United Refining Company was decided
by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.11 2 The discussion on
the ERA is brief because the court found that the petitioner failed
to raise its constitutional claim before the Board and therefore the
claim had been waived. Nonetheless, the court went on to state in
a footnote that if it were to consider the argument, it would do so
by applying the three-part test found in Payne, and it would
conclude that all of the prongs "weigh in favor of

107Id. at 588-89 (citing Payne, 312 A.2d at 94).
108

Id. at 589.

10Id.
112

2017).

United Ref. Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 A.3d 1125, 1129 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
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constitutionality." 113 United Refining also made no mention of
Robinson Hin its brief footnote on this subject.
In Funk v. Wolf petitioners brought a declaratory action in
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court against the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission (PUC), alleging that by not developing
and implementing a comprehensive plan to regulate carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases in light of the present and
projected effects of global climate change, the PUC has not fulfilled
114
The case was
its constitutional obligations under the ERA.

decided on July 26, 2016.115
Interpreting the language of the ERA, the court noted that
"[w]hile expansive in its language, the ERA was not intended to be
read in absolutist terms so as to prohibit development that
enhances the economic opportunities and welfare of the people
currently living in Pennsylvania."1 1 6 Rather, the court continued,
"the ERA places policymakers in the constant and difficult position
of weighing conflicting environmental and social concerns and in
arriving at a course of action that will be expedient as well as
reflective of the high priority which constitutionally has been
placed on the conservation of our natural, scenic, esthetic and
historical resources."1 17 "To this end, we recently described the,.
ERA as a thumb on the scale, giving greater weight to the
environmental concerns in the decision-making process when
environmental concerns of development are juxtaposed with
18
economic benefits of development."1
The Funk Court then applied the three-part balancing test
outlined in Payne.11 9 The opinion mentions in a footnote that while,,
Robinson II criticized the Payne test, its critique is not binding
precedent.1 20 In any event, the Payne test is "somewhat less
satisfying when, as here, a person alleges that the government
failed to affirmatively engage in an action required by its

Id. at 1137 n.12.
Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 232-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
11 Id. at 228.
116 Id. at 233 (citing Payne, 361 A.2d at 273); see also Robinson II 83 A.3d at 958
("the duties to conserve and maintain [public natural resources] are tempered by legitimate
development tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania's citizenry").
117 Id. at 233 (quoting Payne, 312 A.2d at 94) (internal quotation removed).
118 Id. at 234 (internal quotation removed).
113
114

119 Id.
120

Id. at 234 n.2.
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trusteeship duties under the ERA's second provision."121 Citing to
a different part of Payne, the court wrote that "merely to assert
that one has a common right to a protected value under the
trusteeship of the State, and that value is about to be invaded,
creates no automatic right to relief. The [ERA] speaks in no such
absolute terms."1 22

Petitioners were asking the court to require the PUC to
develop and implement a plan to conserve and maintain the public
natural resources through regulation of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. 123 While admitting that the ERA imposed
mandatory duties "in the general sense," the court wrote that the
question before it was "whether the ERA provide[d] Petitioners
with a clear right to the performance of specific acts ... ."124
Discussing mandatory duties imposed upon the executive branch,
the court held that according to precedent, the ERA "may impose
an obligation upon the Commonwealth to consider the propriety of
preserving land as open space, [but] it cannot legally operate to
expand the powers of a statutory agency .... [The ERA] could
operate only to limit such powers as had been expressly delegated
by proper enabling legislation."1 2 5 Because the ERA does not
authorize the PUC to "disturb the legislative scheme,"1 26 and
because petitioners could point to no legislative enactments or
regulatory provisions that require the PUC to do any of the actions
sought in the writ, the mandamus and declaratory relief were
denied.1 27

Without explicitly stating so, the Funk Court also implied
that the ERA was not self-executing, as it held that the ERA "could
operate only to limit such powers as had been expressly delegated
by proper enabling legislation."1 2 8 The court made no reference to
previous precedent on the issue.

Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 235 (quoting Payne, 361 A.2d at 272-73).
123 Id. at 239.
124 Id. at 248.
125 Id. at 249 (quoting Cmty. Coll. ofDela ware Cty. v. Fox, 342
A.2d 468, 482 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. (1975)).
126 Id. at 250.
127 Id. at 250-51.
128 Id. at 249.
121

122
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B. Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa.2017)

Foundation
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v.

Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth (PEDI) is the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case interpreting the ERA. After a decision from the
Commonwealth Court in 2015, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
published an opinion on June 20, 2017.129 PEDF is a critical
decision for two reasons. First, it was the first majority opinion
that rejected the Payne test for determining violations of the ERA:
"[Wie reject the [Payne] test developed by the Commonwealth
Court as the appropriate standard for deciding Article I, § 27
challenges."1 3 0 Second, it was the first majority opinion to hold that
the public trust provisions of the ERA were self-executing: "[W]e
re-affirm our prior pronouncements that the public trust
provisions of § 27 are self-executing." 13 1
In PED1, the Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation sought a declaratory judgment, challenging the
constitutionality of statutory enactments relating to funds
generated from the leasing of state forest and park lands for oil
and gas exploration and extraction. "Because state parks and
forests, including the oil and gas therein, are part of the corpus of
Pennsylvania's environmental public trust," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that "the Commonwealth, as trustee, must
manage them according to the plain language of § 27, which
imposes fiduciary duties consistent with Pennsylvania trust,
law." 132
The court quoted Professor John Dernbach to summarize
the lengthy facts in this case:
Three legislative amendments to the state fiscal
code between 2008 and 2014 redirected a total of
$335 million that would have been used for

129 PEDF1 161 A.3d at 916; see also Matt Fair, Pa. Court Limits Review Over
2018),
12,
(Jan.
LAW360
Funds,
Lease
Gas
of
Use
State's
https://www.1aw360.com/energy/articles/1001574/pa-court-limits-review-over-state-s-useof-gas-lease -funds.

130 Id. at 930.

131 Id. at 936-37 (The court did not hold that the first clause of Section 27enforcement of the people's rights against owners of private property-was self-executing
because prior case law has not resolved the issue and the Commonwealth in this case did
not take a position on the issue).
132 Id. at 916.
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conservation purposes under the [Lease Fund Act]
to the general fund, where it is appropriated for a
variety of state government purposes. In addition,
the Legislature prevented the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR) from
spending any [Lease Fund Act] royalties without
prior
legislative
authorization.
Finally,
the
Legislature began using [Lease Fund] revenue to
support the overall budget of DCNR, rather than
obtaining that budget money from the general fund
and using [Lease Fund] money for conservation
purposes related to oil and gas extraction. 133

The Commonwealth Court held that there was no violation of the
ERA. 134 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard oral argument to
examine the proper standards for judicial review of government
actions and legislation challenged under the ERA in light of
Robinson H and whether the General Assembly's transfers from
the Lease Fund were, in fact, unconstitutional under the ERA.1 35
Perhaps most importantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court settled two questions that remained open-ended as a result
of the Robinson Hplurality. First, PEDFrejected the Payne test
as the appropriate standard for deciding Article I, § 27 challenges,
declaring that the test is "unrelated to the text of § 27 and the trust
principles animating it [and] strips the constitutional provision of
its meaning." 136 The court stated that it agreed with Robinson I's
analysis of the Payne test's drawbacks.13 7 Instead, the court held,
"when reviewing
challenges
to the
constitutionality of

133 Id. at 925 (quoting John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a
ConstitutionalPublic Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 488 (2015)) (internal quotation removed).
134 Id. at 928.

135

Id. at 929.

136 Id. at 930.
137 Id.; Robinson II 83 A.3d at 967 (plurality opinion) ("First,
the Payne test
describes the Commonwealth's obligations-both as trustee and under the first clause of
Section 27-in much narrower terms than the constitutional provision. Second, the test
assumes that the availability of judicial relief premised upon Section 27 is contingent upon
and constrained by legislative action. And, finally, the Commonwealth Court's Payne
decision and its progeny have the effect of minimizing the constitutional duties of executive
agencies and the judicial branch, and circumscribing the abilities of these entities to carry
out their constitutional duties independent of legislative control... the non-textual Article I,
Section 27 test established in Payne and its progeny is inappropriate to determine matters
outside the narrowest category of cases.
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Commonwealth actions under § 27, the proper standard of judicial
review lies in the text of Article I, § 27 itself as well as the
underlying principles of Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the
time of its enactment." 3 s The court then examined the contours of
the ERA in order to "identify the rights of the people and the
obligations of the Commonwealth guaranteed thereunder."1 39 This
discussion largely mirrored and affirmed the discussion found in
the Robinson I plurality, which was cited numerous times
throughout.140
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus reversed the
holding of the Commonwealth Court, finding that the phrase "for
the benefit of all the people" in the ERA is unambiguous and
clearly indicates that the assets of the trust are to be used for
conservation and maintenance purposes. The legislative
amendments to the state fiscal code that redirected money to the
General Assembly for the general fund were held to be
unconstitutional and a violation of the ERA.141
The second important question that PEDFresolved was
that of self-execution. The court confirmed that prior case law had
not resolved the issue of whether § 27 required implementing
legislation to be effective, "at least in regard to an attempt to
enforce the people's rights against owners of private property."1 42
Thus, as to the first clause of the ERA, the question of selfexecution had not been resolved. The court, however, also
recognized that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in
Payne concluded that the trust provisions in § 27 did not "require
legislative action in order to be enforced against the,
Commonwealth in regard to public property."l 43 Therefore, the
public trust provisions of § 27 were self-executing.1 44
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Baer
summarized the impact of the majority opinion in PEDF
Through today's decision, this Court takes several
monumental steps in the development of the
Environmental Rights Amendment, Article I, § 27 of

138

PEDF1, 161 A.3d at 930.

139 Id.
140 Id.

143

at 930-33.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 936 (citing Robinson I 83 A.3d at 964-65).
Id. at 937 (citing Payne, 361 A.3d at 272).

144

Id.

141
142
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the Pennsylvania Constitution. I agree with many of
the Majority's holdings, including Part IV.A.'s
dismantling of the Commonwealth Court's Payne
test, which stood for nearly fifty years, the
confirmation that the public trust provisions of the
amendment are self-executing in Part IV.C., and the
recognition in footnote 23 that all branches of the
Commonwealth are trustees of Pennsylvania's
natural resources. These holdings solidify the
jurisprudential sea-change begun by Chief Justice
Castille's plurality in Robinson Township v.

Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901, 950-51
(2013) (plurality), which rejuvenated § 27 and
dispelled the oft-held view that the provision was
merely an aspirational statement.145

C. Post-PEDF
One of the first lower court cases decided after PEDFwas
FriendsofLackawanna v. Pennsylvania,14 6 published November 8,
2017. In Friends of Lackawanna, the Environmental Hearing
Board heard a challenge to the renewal of a ten-year permit for a
municipal solid waste landfill operated by Keystone Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. (Keystone).147 This renewal was approved by the DEP
and challenged by Friends of Lackawanna (FOL), a neighborhood
environmental group.us FOL alleged DEP had failed "to fulfill its
responsibilities under Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution."1 4 9
The Environmental Hearing Board stated that "Article 1, §
27 applies to the Department's decision to renew a municipal waste
landfill permit" and "[t]he Department may not take such an action
in derogation of its constitutional responsibilities."1 5 0 The Board
then cited its recent description of the Department's duties and
responsibilities under the Pennsylvania Constitution in Centerfor

Id. at 940.
Friends of Lackawanna v. Pennsylvania, EHB Dkt. No. 2015-063-L, 2017 Pa.
Envirn. LEXIS 73 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 8, 2017).
147 Id. at *17.
us Id. at *1-2.
14' Id. at *34.
150 Id. at *20.
14

46
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Coalield Justice v. DEP, EHB Docket No. 2014-072-B
(Adjudication, Aug. 15, 2017) (CCJ), where it applied the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in PEDF15 ' The Board
wrote:
We held in CCJ that the proper approach in
evaluating the Department's decision under the first
part of Article I, § 27 is, first, for the Board to ensure
that the Department considered the environmental
effects of its actions. The Department cannot make
an informed decision regarding the environmental
effects of its action if it does not have an adequate
understanding of what those effects are or will be ....
We must then decide whether the Department
determined that any degradation,
correctly
diminution, depletion, or deterioration of the
environment that is likely to result from the
approved activity is reasonable or unreasonable. We
must then decide whether the Department correctly
determined that any degradation, diminution,
depletion, or deterioration of the environment that
is likely to result from the approved activity is
reasonable or unreasonable .... In CCJ, we expressly

rejected the notion, advocated here by Keystone,
that the Article I, § 27 Constitutional standard [is]
coextensive with compliance with the statutes and
the regulations governing clean water. The Supreme
Court in PEDF clearly rejected such an approach
when it rejected the Payne [v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1978)] test.1 52
While vague, the standard is "not unlike the judgment that must
53
be brought to bear regarding other constitutional provisions."1
In FriendsofLackawanna, the Board held that "Article I, §
27 requires effective oversight by the Department over a solid
waste disposal facility accepting up to 7,500 tons of waste per day
in such close proximity to densely populated areas" because "[t]he

151
152

Id. at *34 (internal quotation removed).
Id. at *38-39.

153 Id. at *39.
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lack of effective oversight will almost certainly lead to an
impingement of the neighbors' constitutionally assured rights." 54
The Board, however, was willing to renew the permit on the
condition that DEP exercised the requisite oversight.15 5 The Board
concluded that "[sihutting down this facility at this juncture [was]
simply too extreme a resolution in the context of a permit
renewal." 156

In November of 2017, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
15 7 UGI
Court decided UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Reading.

Utilities, Inc. (UGI) challenged a city ordinance that imposed
restrictions on the location of gas meters in historic districts, 15 8
arguing that the Public Utility Code preempted the ordinance. 5 9
In response,. the city argued that "preemption [did] not apply
because the location of meters in historic districts implicates its
protection of historic resources under Article 1, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution." 160
The court stated the issue was "not the importance or
legitimacy of the City's purpose"; rather, it was "whether it [had]
been preempted by the state," noting that "Article 1, § 27 [did] not
immunize local regulation from preemption."1 6 1 The court found a
single exception to preemption "where the state statute or
regulation on which preemption is based so completely removes
environmental protections that it violates the state's duties under
that constitutional provision," citing to the plurality decision in
Robinson 11162 The court further explained:
The reason that preemption fails in such a case is
that
the
preempting
state
law
itself is
unconstitutional. That situation is not present here.
The City does not claim that [the PUC Regulation]
violates Article 1, § 27 or is unconstitutional in any
respect. Nor is there any basis on which a court

15 Id. at *61-62.
155 See id. at *1.

Id. at *61.
UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Reading, No. 499 M.D. 2015, 2017 WL 5580066, at
*1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 21, 2017).
158 Id
156
5

.

17

159

Id.

Id. at *5.
Id.
162 d
160
161
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could conclude that the PUC's safety regulation of
gas meters violates Article 1, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, as it in fact takes into
account the interest in protection of historic
resources by providing for consideration of indoor
meter placement in historic districts. 163
Thus, the claims made in Friends ofLackawanna and UGI
Utihtieswere both struck down under Article I, § 27.164
D. Evaluation
PEDF'slong-term effect on the lower courts' approach to
ERA claims will remain to be seen. The most notable change
post-PEDFhas been the inability of the lower courts to fall back
on the three-part Payne test. It was clear that Robinson I alone
was not enough to make the lower courts forgo this easy-to-apply
standard; what is less clear is the new standard that shouldreplace Payne after PEDF. Neither Robinson Hnor PEDFprovided
as clear of a test for courts to apply to an alleged ERA violation.
Some scholars argue that the ERA violation analysis should no
longer involve a balancing test of any kind. 165 In application,
however, that may not prove to be realistic.
Based on the few pre-PEDFcases cited in this Article,
courts often passed over the harder-to-apply Robinson Ilanalysis.

163

Id.

64
1 See

In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, No. 1780 C.D. 2016 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. October 24, 2017). On May 18, 2016, Sunoco filed a declaration to condemn various
easements to construct a portion of a pipeline project named Mariner East 2. Shortly
thereafter, the Condemnee filed preliminary objections, which were overruled. Condemnee
then filed a motion for reconsideration, where it added additional arguments. The first of
these arguments was "that the PUC's existing procedures unconstitutionally exclude
landowners potentially impacted by Mariner East 2; Sunoco or the PUC were required to
notify landowners that the PUC process would be used to remove private property rights;
direct mail contact would have afforded reasonable minimal landowner notice; and, the
Township did not have notice." The Commonwealth Court considered these issues to be
waived because the condemnee failed to raise them for the first time in its motion for
reconsideration. The second argument concerned the trustee function for natural resources.

"Condemnee further asserts that no entity is serving as trustee of the Commonwealth's
natural resources for Mariner East 2." However, once again, because Condemnee did not

include this issue in its Preliminary Objections, the court concluded it was waived.
165 See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 504 ("[I]n the absence of concretely defined and
constitutionally protect property, or other, rights weighed against environmental rights,
there should be no balancing of constitutionally protected environmental rights.").
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This was possible because it was a plurality decision. But with the
majority ruling in PEDF which endorses the Robinson Ianalysis
on the contours of the ERA, this may be beginning to change.
Despite this change in analysis, it remains the case that
claims under Article I, § 27 are by no means a sure success, as
demonstrated in Friends ofLackawanna and UGI Utilties. Both
with and without the Payne test, petitioners alleging a violation
under the ERA often fail in the lower courts. Perhaps one
explanation is that the petitioners' claims were simply weak in
that they only asserted generalized environmental harms rather
than specific facts. Thus, regardless of the fact that Paynehas been
replaced, if a petitioner cannot allege a specific claim, the
complaint will be dismissed.
To illustrate, in Brockway, the petitioner argued against
issuing a drilling permit because the municipality's "natural
resources [would] be injured in violation of Article I, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution ...
."166 In Funk, the petitioner
requested the court to mandate the PUC to implement a plan to
reduce carbon monoxide and greenhouse gases. In UnitedRefining
Company, the court stated that the "[pletitioner's overarching
theme in this appeal is that the Department's approval of the
permit ... is at odds with the purposesof ... the Oil and Gas Act ...
which Petitioner characterizes as assuring safe oil and gas
development."16 7 The court further explained: "[Pletitioner asserts
that the permit violates the purposes of the Oil and Gas Act by
threatening the health and safety of the environment ... , [but] does
not assert that the issuance of the permit actually violates a
substantive provision of the Oil and Gas Act."168 Moreover, in
Feudale, the claim failed because "merely alleging that DCNR's
proposed action will do harm to the [land] is insufficient to
establish a claim under the [ERA."169 What does this mean? In a
footnote the court explained that, although Feudale did invoke a
specific act (i.e., the History Code) in his complaint, "he allege[d]
no facts specific to any cause of action under the History Code and

166 Brockway Borough Mun. Auth. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 131 A-3d 578, 580 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2016).
167 United Ref. Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 A.3d 1125, 1129 (Pa. Commw.
Ct.
2017).
168 Id.
169 Feudale v. Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc., 122 A.3d 462 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015).
(citing PEDFI 108 A.3d at 158-59).
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fail[ed] to allege any facts which would establish his right to relief
under the History Code."170
As for the post-PEDFcases, both Friends of Lackawanna
and UGI Utilities recognized the emphasis placed on
environmental rights by the Pennsylvania Constitution, citing
much of the language from PEDFand Robinson II But the Board
in FriendsofLackawannastill determined that the petitioners did
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the DEP "fail[ed]
to fulfill [its] responsibilities under Article I, § 27."171 And in UGI
Utilities,it was enough for the court that petitioners failed to claim
the PUC Regulation violated Article 1, § 27 in the first place. 172
Thus, perhaps simply alleging a generalized claim of
environmental harm is not sufficient; rather, petitioners must
prove something more specific in order to be entitled to relief. If
the past cases are any indication, a petitioner must allege more
than a just a general grievance of environmental harm.
CONCLUSION

At this juncture, the most that can be said about the
plurality opinion in Robinson His that it may have triggered a new
way of thinking about the ERA. That opinion alone, however, did
not have the momentous impact that some predicted, as lower
courts found the unbinding plurality opinion easy to ignore in favor,
of a more rigid, familiar test. Occasionally, plurality decisions will
provide the basis for future majority opinions, which is exactly
what happened in PEDF Because the Pennsylvania Supreme.
Court decision in PEDFwas decided just months ago, only time.,
will tell how lower courts respond to the now-majority opinion.
Furthermore, case law demonstrating the lower courts' response
will be slow to develop as such decisions will be few and far
between. Cases that determine the constitutionality of a legislative
or administrative action are a last resort for courts, as "[i]t is
well-settled that when a case raises both constitutional and
non-constitutional issues, a court should not reach the

170

Id. at 468 n.9 (emphasis added).

171 Friends of Lackawanna v. Pennsylvania, EHB Dkt. No. 2015-063-L, 2017 Pa.

Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *34 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 8, 2017).
172 UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Reading, No. 499 M.D. 2015, 2017 WL 5580066, at
*5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 21, 2017).
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constitutional issue if the case can properly be decided on
non-constitutional grounds."1 7 3 Thus, it may be years before a clear
pattern emerges, if at all.
What is clear at this point, however, is that there are
numerousissues which PEDFdidnot decide. PEDFleftopen many
questions for Pennsylvania courts, including whether the first
clause of the ERA is self-executing, what remedies are available to
private plaintiffs (assuming they have a right to sue other private
actors), whether the ERA empowers any agency to take an action
not
authorized
by
statute,
whether
tribunals
(or other agencies) can second guess standards for air and water
quality if established by environmental statutes and regulations,
when a law "unreasonably impairs" the right to clear air, pure
water, and the preservation of certain environmental values,
whether a permit that authorizes a person to use his property
constitutes "state action," whether local governments are included
in the term "trustee," and the scope of terms such as "clean air,"
"pure water," "natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values,"
"environment," and "public natural resources."
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the revitalization of Article I,
§ 27 has raised more questions than it answered. Five years later,
it is difficult to conclude what the meaning and scope of
environmental rights for Pennsylvanians are, or what precisely is
the Commonwealth's duty as a public trustee. But the case law so
far shows us that while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may
have discussed a commitment to environmental concerns, courts
in general have been hesitant to grant unfounded claims.

173 Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 436 A.2d 186, 187 (Pa. 1981);
see also
Dernbach, supra note 7, at 485.

